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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The global economy is undergoing a profound and momentous shift. The first 
half of the 21st century will undoubtedly be dominated by the consequences of 
a new Asian dynamism. China is likely to become the second biggest 
economy in the world by 2016, and India the third largest by 2035. The rise of 
China and India as global economic and political powers is one of the most 
important transformative processes of our time – challenging the international 
political economy dominated by the “transatlantic West”.  it is likely to remain 
significant for many years to come. A cluster of other countries in the Asian 
region, such as Thailand and Vietnam, are also growing rapidly. We refer to 
these newly dynamic Asian economies collectively as the "Asian Drivers of 
Global Change’. The term ‘driver’ signifies the distinctive and significant 
impact which these emerging economies are likely to have on the global 
economy, arising not just from their size, but also from their distinctive public 
and private actors. The economic processes they engender are likely to  
radically transform regional and global economic, political and social 
interactions and to have a major impact on the environment. This is a critical 
‘disruption’ to the global economic and political order that has held sway for 
the past five decades. It is reshaping the world as we know it, heralding a new 
‘Global-Asian’ era.  
 
The impact of the Asian Drivers on the global political economy has, to date, 
largely been considered in relation to the developed world. Yet these newly 
emergent Asian economies pose huge challenges for the rest of the 
developing world, presenting both threat and opportunity. China, for example, 
offers a rapidly growing market for commodity exporting countries, but it is 
also the leading exporter for many labour-intensive, manufactured products, 
potentially accelerating a ‘race to the bottom’ elsewhere. Additionally, with 
their growing economic power, China and India can change the ‘rules of the 
game’ on international trade and in the global political economy more 
generally. Their successful experience – largely at variance with the 
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“augmented” Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2002) – also provides new 
policy role models for other developing economies. 
 
This Special Issue addresses these challenges, based on an initial 
assessment of the impact of the Asian Drivers on the developing world. It 
reflects the output of a networked research programme, involving a group for 
researchers drawn from high and low income economies 
(www.ids.ac.uk/asiandrivers). In this Introduction we briefly address the 
historical significance of the Asian Driver economies, and provide a taxonomy 
for assessing their global impact, particularly on developing economies. 
Section 2 identifies six factors which convince us that the rise of the Asian 
Drivers is historically significant, having a non-marginal impact on the global 
economy. This is followed in Section 3 by a listing of the major challenges this 
poses to developing economies and the development agenda. Section 3 
identifies the major channels of interaction between the Asian Drivers and the 
developing world. In this we elaborate a methodological framework designed 
to assess the nature and degree of these developmental impacts. In the 
concluding section we briefly summarise the papers which are included in this 
Special Issue. 
 
2. “ASIAN DRIVERS” 
 
Regional economic agglomerations have been an important feature of recent 
economic history (Evans, Kaplinsky and Robinson, 2005). The global trading 
system during the 1960s was a bipolar world, dominated by the US and 
Europe and their close neighbours and ex-colonies. The following two 
decades saw the emergence of an East and Southeast trading group, largely 
reflecting the rise of Japan and the Asian Tigers, with increasingly close links 
to the North American trading bloc. Towards the close of the twentieth 
century, the Asian bloc grew to a dominant role in global trade, but this time 
driven by the dynamism of two large new Asian economies, India and China. 
In China’s case the growth spurt began in the late 1970s, and in India, from 
the early 1990s. 
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As McDonald, Robinson and Thierfelder in this volume show, China and India 
reflect very different growth paths. China is integrated into an outward-
oriented regional economy, involving fine divisions of labour in many sectors. 
By contrast (at least until now) India represents much more of a “standalone”* 
economic system. Yet, notwithstanding these differences in structure, they 
pose major and distinct challenges for the global and developing economies, 
for six major reasons. 
 
The first is as a consequence of their size. As Figure 1 shows, from the 
beginning of their growth spurts (1979 and 1992 respectively), neither GDP or 
export growth in the two largest Asian Driver economies was unique. 
However, in 2004 China accounted for 20% of the world’s population and 
India for 17%. By contrast, at no time did the combined population of Japan 
and Korea’s exceed four percent of the global total (Figure 2). So, unlike the 
case of Korea and Japan, which could grow without severe disruption to the 
global economy we have to suspend the “small-country” assumption In the 
case of the Asian Drivers. The very high trade intensity of China’s growth 
makes the big-country effect particularly prominent in its case (Figure 3). 
Between 1985 and 2005, China’s exports rose from $50bn to $798 billion, 
transforming China into the world´s third largest trading nation. The big size 
effect of China and India amounts to tectonic shifts in the world economy. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Second, these economies embody markedly different combinations of state 
and capitalist development compared with the industrialised world. Chinese 
enterprises have their roots in state ownership, usually arising from very large 
and often regionally-based firms (Nolan, 2005; Shankar, 2005). They reflect a 
complex and dynamic amalgam of property rights – “The ownership of each of 
China’s large SOEs [state owned enterprises] has spread gradually among a 
variety of public institutions, each of which has an interest in the firm’s 
performance… [b]ased on the ‘ownership maze’ and vaguely defined property 
rights” (Nolan, 2005: 169). With access to cheap (and often subsidised) long-
term capital, these firms operate with distinctive time-horizons and are less 
risk-averse than their western counterparts Tull, 2006). Indian firms are 
probably less distinct from the western model, although they tend to be less 
specialised and often include elements of social commitment which are largely 
alien to western firms (Humphrey, Kaplinsky and Saraph, 1998). Associated 
with these complex forms of ownership and links to regional and central state 
bodies, Chinese firms often operate abroad as a component of a broader 
strategic thrust. This is particularly prominent in China’s advance in SSA in its 
search for the energy and commodities required to fuel its industrial advance 
(Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, 2006). It is likely, therefore, that Asian 
Driver firms (and particularly Chinese enterprises) will interact with the global 
economy – including through outward foreign direct investment (FDI) – in 
historically distinctive ways. 
 
The third reason why the Asian Drivers present a new and significant 
challenge to the global and developing economies is that they combine low 
incomes and low wages with significant innovative potential. In 2006, China 
overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest investor in R&D and 
although the output of engineers and scientists in these economies is often 
overestimated (Gereffi, Wadhwa and Rissing, 2006), and although the 
number of engineers and scientists per capita is relatively low by comparison 
with global innovation leaders, there nevertheless is a large pool of human 
capabilities to foster innovation. The return of graduates studying abroad 
(Saxenian, 2006; Shenkar, 2005) – the “brain gain” – has also done much to 
foster innovative capabilities. However, this growth in innovative capability 
does not necessarily signify an inability to compete across the range of factor 
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prices. The oft-stated belief (and hope?) that China will run out of unskilled 
labour is belied by the size of its reserve army of unemployed, estimated at 
around 150m compared to the 83m people employed in formal sector 
manufacturing in 2002 (Kaplinsky, 2005). As Shenkar observes, “China’s 
enormous labor reserves, with pay scales radically lower in the hinterland than 
the coast and in urban areas (the average income on the farm, where more 
than half of the Chinese population lives, is less than $25 per month), creates 
the equivalent of a country within a country; so, instead of Vietnam or 
Bangladesh replacing China as a labour-intensive haven, Hunan will replace 
Guangdong” (Shenkar, 2005: 134).  Moreover by 2030, India, also with a 
large reserve army of underemployed, is likely to have a larger population 
than China. There is no doubt, that  the Asian Drivers are altering the 
underlying patterns of the global labour markets (Polaski, 2006). 
 
Fourth, China and India are associated with very different forms of regional 
integration. China is part of a distributed regional network of production, 
reflecting wider regional competitiveness. Traded goods ‘manufactured in 
China’ in fact increasingly emanate from regional production systems. China’s 
trade with East Asia grew very rapidly and significantly during the 1990s, 
initially with a growing surplus ($12bn in 1990 and $20bn in 2000) and then 
falling into deficits of $17bn in 2003 and $35bn in 2005. An increasing 
proportion of China’s trade involves the processing of imported raw materials 
and intermediates (widely referred to in the literature as “verticalised trade”, 
Feenstra, 1998; Hummels, Rapaport and Yi, 1998). Official data show that this 
form of trade grew to $404.8 billion in 2003 (48 per cent of the total trade 
volume), up from $2.5 billion in 1981( 5.7 per cent of total trade)  
(NiHaoOuZhou_com, (2006), Foreign firms dominate China's exports, 
accessed 30th June 2006). By contrast, Indian exports are more an outcome 
of a ‘national system of production, so that the spread effects of the growth 
paths of these two Asian driver economies are likely to be very different. 
 
Fifth, the economic rise of China and India result in large-scale changes in 
important global governance arenas. Both countries are now heavily engaged 
and influential in global organisations(Figure 4), but whereas India has long 
been a participant, China’s global presence is more recent (Figure 5). Whilst 
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the nature of their political engagements with the rest of the world differ 
sharply, they increasingly affect global and regional governance (Chan, 2006; 
Heberer and Senz 2007; Wang 2003; Gu, Humphrey and Messner in this 
Issue).  The role of China and India as actors of global change has largely 
been ignored in the global governance literature (Nye and Donahue, 2000; 
Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler, 2002). But the simultaneous rise of both 
Asian giants (Winters and Yusuf, 2007) in world politics represents a far 
reaching power shift in global affairs with few parallels in history. India still 
plays a major role as an “advocate” of  the interests of the developing 
countries, for example as the leader of G22 within the WTO. China is 
promoting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (formed by China, Russia, 
Kazakstan, Kirgistan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan) as a significant player in the 
area of global energy policies. China and India also provide a different policy 
role-model for many developing economies, with the possible rise of a “Beijing 
Consensus” to rival the Washington Consensus. Ramo, interviewing key 
informants in China in the early years of the twenty-first century, characterises 
this new policy agenda as involving a measured pace of reform (rather than a 
big-bang approach) and allowing for country-specific responses (rather than a 
one-size-fits-all policy agenda) (Ramo, 2004). We perceive these dynamics as 
a transition from a quasi-unilateral,  US and western dominated world order to 
a multipolar power constellation, with the two Asian giants  as new global 
governance poles. This power shift could  lead to new turbulences and 
conflicts between the rising and the declining powers within the global 
governance system and will reshape profoundly the existing “North – South 
relationships” (Humphrey and Messner, 2006). Whilst the more proactive 
global engagement of China and India may lead them to become “responsible 
and productive global citizens”  (Bergsten et a., 2006: X); they are 
nevertheless likely to challenge the interests of other major powers and 
existing international norms. Richard Haass put it this way: "The choice ... is 
between an effective multilateralism and either a gradual return to a world of 
great power competition or a world overwhelmed by disruptive forces, or 
both." (Haass, 2005: 17)   
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Finally, the huge natural resource hunger and energy needs of China and 
India will in the future serve to place the issue of sustainability squarely back 
on the agenda of global politics and development policies. By 2015 China´s 
energy demand is expected to roughly double, India´s to rise by 50 per cent. 
Today China is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases (only 
exceeded by the US) and is already responsible for 16,5 per cent of global 
CO2 emissions, the corresponding figure for India being 4 per cent (Germany 
3,5 per cent) (Richerzhagen and Scholz in this Issue). And as far as imports of 
tropical timber are concerned, China is now the world’s largest importer of 
softwood and hardwood logs (Financial Times, 5th May, 2007: 19). Given that 
the OECD countries are still not habile to reduce substantially its resource 
consumption, the world’s biocapacities will not be sufficient to feed China’s 
and India’s additional resource hunger and sustain their growth. In other 
words: none of the key global environmental challenges will be solved without 
China and India (World Watch 2006). From this point of view, China´s and 
India´s prospective innovation capabilities are highly relevant from a growth 
and global sustainability perspective. The flip side of the discussion on 
sustainability and global climate change is the renaissance of geo-economics 
and geo-politics: competition between the “old” and the “new” global powers 
for energy and resources in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia and Russia 
(Umbach 2005).  
 
 
3. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN DRIVER ECONOMIES ON 
THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
 
 
The rapid and distinctive growth of these large Asian Driver economies thus 
poses six  distinct development-related questions 
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1. What are the consequences of the emergence of the Asian Drivers for 
economic growth in other developing economies, both in relation to 
individual-country performance and for different regions? 
 
2. Who are likely to be the losers and winners from the growing dynamism of 
the Asian Drivers, within and between low-income economies, and within 
and between regional clusters of low-income economies?  
 
3. Given these international growth and distributional impacts, what are the 
implications for development strategies in developing economies? 
 
4. How should developing countries engage with the global economy in 
general, and the Asian Drivers in particular? 
 
5. Given the rapid growth and size of the Asian Drivers, what are the 
implications of this shift in global power for institutions of  regional and 
global governance, in the public, private and non-governmental sectors? 
How will this shifts in the global governance arenas affect developing 
countries? 
 
6. Given the enormous resource and energy hunger of the Asian Drivers, 
what are the consequences for other developing countries in 
environmental terms (e.g. impacts of  accelerating climate change), 
economic terms (e.g. rising resource and energy prices), geopolitical terms 
(e.g. conflicts for resources) and regarding development strategies and 
policies (e.g. from pro poor growth to sustainable development)? 
 
These questions need to be addressed in a systematic framework, and here 
we distinguish between three sets of structuring principles – the channels of 
Asian Driver interaction with the global economy; the distinction between 
complementary and competitive impacts; and the difference between direct 
and indirect impacts. 
 
(a) Channels of interaction 
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There are a variety of different channels through which individual countries 
interact with other economies, in their regions and elsewhere. Clearly, these 
channels are contingent – they change over time, and vary in importance 
depending on factors such as location, resource endowment, trade links, and 
geo-strategic significance. Currently, and in aggregate, six key channels stand 
out in importance. 
 
The first of these are the trade links between the Asian drivers and the global 
economy. China’s share of global merchandise trade had risen to 7.5 per cent  
by 2005, exceeding that of Japan, and growing particularly rapidly from the 
mid 1990s (Table 1), a period in which the US’s share of merchandise trade 
fell appreciably. By 2004, China’s share of global manufacturing exports had 
risen to 8.3 per cent, still below that of the US and Germany, but growing 
rapidly. By contrast, India’s share of global  merchandise trade was basically 
stable in the same period, at a much lower level than China’s. However, 
India’s share of global service trade, particularly information technology 
services grew (although no clear comparative data are available).  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The second major channel of interaction is FDI. Already the Asian Drivers 
account for the major share of global inward FDI, with China and Hong Kong 
alone attracting almost 40 percent of total FDI destined for developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 2005). But the Asian Drivers are increasingly also a 
source of outward FDI. In some regions – SSA in particular (Kaplinsky, 
McCormick and Morris, 2006) – China has become the major source of new 
inward FDI, particularly in economies which because of their political fragility, 
have been shunned by western investors for some years. There are four 
primary types of FDI – technology-leveraging, resource seeking, market 
seeking and cost reducing. Chinese outward investment clearly fits-into the 
first three of these – technology leveraging investments in the US (and, to a 
lesser extent, the EU), and resource-seeking and market-seeking investments 
predominantly in other developing economies. 
The third channel is finance. Large trade surpluses in both China and India 
coupled with these countries’ ability to attract FDI and other categories of 
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capital flows have led to a build-up of large foreign reserves (estimated at 
more than $1.2trillion for China alone in 2006. A significant change in how 
Asia’s capital surpluses are managed could cause an abrupt adjustment in the 
US interest rates and the dollar and thereby destabilise the entire world 
economy, including by raising global interest rates. It could also accelerate a 
slow-moving structural change which is the gradual weakening of the role of 
the dollar as the world’s main reserve currency. Both of these developments 
have significant indirect implications for other developing countries, affecting 
the structure of global financial markets and the competitiveness of their 
exchange rates. 
 
The fourth channel of interaction  arises in relation to institutions of global and 
regional governance. The emerging strategies of China and India towards 
multilateral institutions such as the WTO, the UN, World Bank and IMF, and 
the global climate regime and the bilateral interactions between the US, 
Europe and the Asian Drivers will profoundly change the international context 
for other developing countries (Chan 2006; Messner 2006; Cooper and Fues 
in this Issue). This could create new options for developing countries in global 
governance institutions if China and India would play the role of the “voice of 
the South” in global politics. If they look primarily to their own interests, new 
conflicts between the Asian Drivers and other developing countries might 
arise – for example, in the area of trade, climate change, and regarding 
access to resources. China’s close cooperation with “difficult states” like 
Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe and its close energy 
partnership with Iran provoke tensions with western countries and 
demonstrate that the Asian Drivers are able to alter geo-strategic maps and 
north–south relationships. Many of the contradictory impacts of China´s rise 
on the developing world are have surfaced in Africa - rapidly improving African 
exports to China; a rapid growth in Chinese FDIand aid; concerns about the 
potential negative impacts of Chinese economic and political engagement in 
Africa on social, environmental and human rights standards; fierce rivalry 
between China and Western countries for access to African resources (Tull, 
2006; Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, 2006; Gu, Humphrey and Messner in 
this Issue). With regard to regional cooperation the boldest Asian initiative is 
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JACIK, a framework for economic and political cooperation of Japan, ASEAN, 
China, India and Korea (Kumar 2005). It is not yet clear whether this project 
will be realised in a near future. But there is no doubt the JACIK – and/or 
similar initiatives – are likely to have a significant impact on the structure of 
global governance.  
 
Migration from the Asian Drivers and interactions with diaspora communities 
represents a fifth channel of impact. To some extent, migration is an already 
accomplished historic phenomenon, with large Chinese diasporas in Asia. 
Outward migration from India to SSA occurred during the late 19th century and 
first half of the twentieth century, and in the latter twentieth century extended 
to Europe, North America and Australasia. But more recently, Asian Driver 
migration has risen, particularly to SSA and from China. For example, by 
some counts, the Chinese population living in South Africa grew from 4,000 in 
1946 to 10,000 in 1980, 20,000 in 1994 and to between 100,000 and 200,000 
by 2004 (Wilhelm, 2005). The Chinese population of Lusaka grew from 3,000 
to 30,000 between 1995 and 2005 and Chinese migrant communities are 
increasingly prominent in many African countries, including from poor regions 
in China. 
The sixth and final major channel of impact on other economies arises from 
environmental spillovers. Rapid growth in China and India consumes natural 
resources and generates cross–border environmental damages within the 
Asian region. Problems with the use of natural resources are widely 
documented. Little of the region's timber is managed sustainably, and illegal 
logging is rife. For example, there have been repeated denunciations of the 
activities of illegal Chinese logging companies in Myanmar. Cross-border 
environmental challenges include the Songhua River incident (and 
subsequent water pollution incidents) in November 2005 in northern Chinese 
rivers and the problem of acid rain: it is estimated that between one third and 
one half of acid rain in South Korea and Japan is the result of sulphur dioxide 
emissions from China (Umbach 2005: 212). Beyond that, China´s and India´s 
rapidly rising imports of natural resources from all over the world are creating 
environmental problems in Africa, Latin America and the rest of Asia. The 
most import global environmental impact of rapid growth in the two Asian giant 
economies on developing countries will be their rapidly growing contribution to 
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global climate change. Climate change will damage agricultural resources in 
Africa and Asia, create water shortages around the world, undermine human 
security in many countries and could swamp the governance capacities of 
already weak states (Stern, 2006, WBGU, 2007).   
 
 
(b) Complementary and competitive impacts 
 
Simplistically, and as a starting point, the interactions between the Asian 
Drivers, the global economy and individual regions and countries can be seen 
in a binary framework as comprising a range of complementary or competitive 
impacts. Figure 4 provides some examples, notional, but informed by the 
emerging nature of Asian Driver expansion. In each of these channels of 
interaction, we can observe a mix of complementary and competitive impacts. 
For example, with regard to trade, the Asian Drivers may both provide cheap 
inputs and consumer goods, and be a market for the exports from other 
developing countries. On the other hand, imports from the Asian drivers can 
readily displace local producers. In relation to FDI, the Asian Drivers may 
either be a direct source of inward FDI or crowd-in FDI from third countries as 
parts of extended global value chains. But the Asian drivers may also 
compete with other economies for global FDI. The rising power of the Asian 
Drivers in a western dominated global governance system may strengthen the 
voice of developing countries in international organizations. But the emerging 
conflicts between the Asian Drivers, the US and Europe on energy, resources 
and markets might also marginalize development policy issues in word 
politics.  Similarly, financial flows environmental spillovers and migration may 
be either complementary or competitive. 
The key element of these interactions is the “for whom” component. Countries 
may be affected differentially – in some cases, for example, the export of 
fabrics from the Asian Drivers may feed productively into a vibrant clothing 
and textile value chain; in other cases, it may displace a country’s exports and 
production for the domestic market. But these effects are not just felt at the 
national and economy-wide level. They affect groups within countries 
differentially. For example, cheap clothing imports from China may displace 
clothing and textile workers, but cheapen wage goods and hence reduce 
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wage costs for producers in other sectors (which is indeed what has been 
occurring in many high-income economies during the early years of the 21st 
Century). These impacts on a complementary-competitive axis may also 
change over time, and most importantly, they will vary for different classes, 
regions and groups within economies. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
(c) Direct and indirect impacts 
 
The complementary-competitive axis of impacts is readily comprehended and 
widely recognised. Less widely acknowledged is the distinction between direct 
and indirect impacts. In part this is because the indirect impacts are difficult to 
measure. However, in many cases, the indirect impacts may in fact be much 
more significant than the direct ones. Figure 5 gives some examples, for 
purposes of illustration contrasting direct complementary impacts with indirect 
competitive impacts in Lesotho, a poor SSA economy.i In 2000-2004 
Lesotho’s clothing exports to the US under the AGOA scheme grew very 
rapidly, but were undermined in 2005-6 by Chinese competition following the 
removal of MFA quotas (Kaplinsky and Morris in this Issue). Looking at the 
trade channel, thus, direct complementary impacts included the supply of 
fabrics used in Lesotho’s clothing exports. On the other hand, the indirect 
impact on Lesotho of China’s growing competitiveness in the US led to a 15 
percent fall in exports between 2004 and 2006. Whilst some of these exports 
arose from Taiwanese-owned plants, in other cases potential foreign investors 
in Lesotho preferred to manufacture clothes in China (and India and 
Bangladesh). Lesotho suffered badly from the appreciation of the Rand (to 
which its currency was tied), an indirect impact of Southern Africa’s 
burgeoning commodity exports to China. Lesotho also stands to lose from 
China’s accession to the WTO and the power it might wield in removing 
preferential access to major markets for the exports of least developed 
countries, outweighing any possible positive impact of potential budgetary aid 
to government. Finally, Lesotho’s major export other than clothing (vulnerable 
to Asian Driver competition) and unskilled migrant labour is its water. A 
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change in rainfall patterns consequent on global warming is likely to have very 
adverse economic impacts. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
As in the case of the complementary/competitive access, the impact of the 
direct and indirect impacts can be gauged either at the country level, or at 
intranational levels, for example with regard to different regions, sectors, 
classes and genders. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on this template of different channels of interaction and the recognition 
that impacts can be both complementary and competitive, it is possible to 
move towards a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the Asian 
Drivers on other economies in general, and developing economies in 
particular. As we have noted, this assessment will be contingent on the 
period, the location, the economy in question and the welfare of different 
groups. The pace of change is such that these contingencies are of 
considerable significance. 
 
The papers which follow in this Special Issue address some of these issues. 
The first four papers focus on regional impacts. Using a new global general 
equilibrium trade model, McDonald, Robinson and Thierfelder analyse the 
impact on the global economy, especially developing countries, of the 
dramatic expansion of trade by India, China, and an integrated East and 
Southeast (E&SE) Asia trade bloc. While both India and China are very large 
economies, the two main Asian Drivers differ in economic structures and trade 
patterns. China is an integral member of the E&SE Asia bloc, with strong links 
through regional value chains and trade in intermediate inputs, while India is 
not part of any trade bloc. The analysis considers the importance of their 
different degrees of integration into regional and global economies, focusing 
on potential complementarities and competition with other developing 
countries.  
16 
 
Jenkins, Dussel Peters and Moreira assess the impact of the Asian Drivers on 
Latin America. The rapid growth of China in particular, and its increased 
integration with the global economy is having both direct and indirect effects 
on the Latin American and Caribbean region. This paper identifies the main 
channels through which China’s growth is affecting the region and undertakes 
a preliminary analysis of the impacts that it is having on development. The 
growth of China represents both opportunities and challenges for the Latin 
American and Caribbean economies and the paper suggests where, in terms 
of both countries and sectors, these are concentrated. Finally the paper 
discusses the challenges facing policy makers both in the region and in 
China. 
 
Kaplinsky and Morris focus on the impact of China’s surge in manufactured 
exports on export oriented industrialization strategies. They do this through an 
analysis of SSA’s manufactured exports. Excluding South Africa, more than 
one-half of all SSA’s manufactured exports comprise clothing and textiles, and 
most of these are destined for the US under the preferential African Growth 
and Opportunities ACT (AGOA). Although AGOA continues to provide 
preferential tariff incentives to SSA exporters, as well as allowing the least 
developed countries to utilise low-cost Chinese fabrics, clothing exports to the 
US fell by  26 per cent once quotas on China’s clothing and textile exports to 
the US were removed. Kaplinsky and Morris argue that this sectoral 
experience is suggestive of the wider – indirect - impact of the Asian Drivers 
on other low income economies and argue that a level playing field in global 
trade will be deleterious to export oriented indiustrialization strategies in low 
income economies. This discussion reinforces the conclusions reached by 
Jenkins, Dussell Peters and Moreira for Latin America. It also has a bearing 
on the wider discussion of terms of trade reversal (Kaplinsky, 2006).  
 
Three papers focus on the impact of the Asian Drivers on institutions of global 
governance. Gu, Humphrey and Messner argue that the rise of China and 
India in the world economy and as an important actor in global governance 
arenas may result in an emerging tectonic shift in institutions of global 
governance. What China and India choose to do or not to do has very often 
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profound consequences for many other actors globally. Therefore, the current 
global governance architecture, with its quasi-unilateralist (i.e. US) bias, is 
unlikely to last more than a brief historical moment. A multipolar power 
constellation is emerging, with the US, China, India, and possibly Europe as 
significant poles. The authors focus on the changing role of China in global 
politics and discuss challenges in three dimensions. Firstly, they summarise 
the western and the Chinese debates on the impacts of the rise of China as 
global governance actors. It is clear that the main question for global 
governance processes is how the power shift towards China will be handled. 
The answer to this question is not trivial, given that it is historically 
unprecedented for a developing country to become a significant global 
governance actor, threatening the hitherto unrivalled power of the most 
developed countries in the global economy. Second, their analysis of China´s 
strategies within the WTO and in the field of developing policies in Africa 
demonstrate that China has not yet defined a comprehensive global 
governance strategy. Chinese actors are still learning (albeit, rapidly) how to 
build up governance capabilities in many global governance arenas, and how 
to balance national interests with regional and global challenges and 
responsibilities. The authors argue, that Western and Chinese proactive 
political strategies  towards a peaceful global power transition are needed in 
order to avoid global turbulences. Third, Gu, Humphrey and Messner 
underline that developing countries will have to adapt to these significant  
shifts in the world economy and in global governance arenas and make 
strategic decisions about how to align themselves with China and other  
emerging powerful actors in Asia. 
 
Cooper and Fues address the roles played by China and India in the United 
Nations as an overarching structure of global governance. Commensurate to 
their ascension in the world economy the foreign policies and diplomatic 
styles of both countries are undergoing a rapid transformation. While China 
demonstrates a new sense of assertiveness in the multilateral context, for 
example in exercising its privileged position as permanent member in the 
Security Council, India has moved from a steadfast supporter of Third World 
solidarity in the Nehruvian tradition to a more narrow pursuit of national 
interests through the accumulation of hard power resources in military and 
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economic terms. In the past, both countries have demonstrated only limited 
commitment to the UN reform process except for the contested issue of 
Security Council enlargement where Indian efforts to assume a leadership 
position in the international hierarchy have been frustrated. It remains unclear 
at this point whether China and India will concentrate on the universal UN 
system in their quest for global voice and reach or rather be drawn into a 
concert of great powers with the USA. 
 
Scholz and Richerzhagen focus on the role played by China in the 
governance of climate change. China is rapidly becoming the largest global 
emitter of greenhouse gases. Due to its dynamic economic growth, emissions 
are increasing rapidly, despite the country’s efforts to increase energy 
efficiency and the growing use of renewables. At the same time, China is also 
likely to suffer severely under the impacts of climate change. Therefore, 
pressures are rising, both domestically and externally, for China to address 
the problem of climate change. This paper analyses the efforts made by 
China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through climate-relevant sectoral 
policies (predominantly energy and transport) and with regard to 
environmental policies. The authors conclude that hitherto, China’s climate-
relevant actions have not been induced by climate considerations but rather 
are a by-product of measures embedded in energy and transport policies 
aiming to decrease costs,  to enhance energy security and to promote growth. 
An optimistic perspective is that there is considerable scope for significant 
resource efficiency gains. By contrast, a pessimistic view is that there are 
parallels to the US climate strategy which puts growth and national interests 
first.  
 
In the final paper Altenburg, Schmitz and Stamm address the question of 
whether the Asian Drivers will be able to build up significant innovation 
capabilities in the foreseeable future. Both China and India have become 
major producers of products and services for global markets. It is less clear, 
however, to what extent and in which sectors they will be able to build 
innovation capabilities that challenge the current technological leaders. The 
consequences of such a transition from production to innovation could be 
significant for both developed and developing regions. Drawing on a 
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combination of approaches – innovation systems, global value chains and 
professional networks – the article analyzes four of the most technologically 
dynamic industries in China and India. It  suggests that, although China’s and 
India’s technological efforts have rarely materialized in cutting-edge 
innovations at this stage, they have created conditions to attract the key 
elements of first-class innovation systems. The prospects for making the 
transition from production to innovation capabilities seem good, provided 
growth and capital accumulation continue at a high pace. On the basis of this 
analyses the article sets out possible scenarios for technologically advanced 
and developing countries and identifies questions for future research. It 
argues that advanced countries could be challenged in their core 
competencies and markets, whereas developing countries could benefit from 
rising wage levels in China and India, easing their global competitive pressure 
in labor intensive industries. Access to more appropriate technologies at lower 
prices might be another positive outcome. However, developing countries may 
find it even more difficult to upgrade into the markets for technology-intensive 
goods if China and India successfully combine cutting-edge technological 
capabilities and low-cost production.  
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Table 1: World merchandise trade by region and selected economy, 1948, 
1953, 1963, 1973, 1983, 1993, 2003 and 2005 ($bn and per cent) 
 1948 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2005
 Value 
World  58 84 157 579 1838 3675 7369 10159
 Share 
World  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 United States  21.7 18.8 14.9 12.3 11.2 12.6 9.8 8.9
S. and C. America  12.2 10.4 7.0 4.7 4.4 3.0 3.0 3.5
 Brazil  2.0 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2
Europe  31.4 34.8 41.4 45.3 43.5 45.4 46.0 43.0
Africa  7.3 6.5 5.7 4.8 4.5 2.5 2.4 2.9
Asia 14.0 13.4 12.4 14.9 19.1 26.1 26.1 27.4
 China  0.9 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 2.5 5.9 7.5
 Japan  0.4 1.5 3.5 6.4 8.0 9.9 6.4 5.9
 India  2.2 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
 Six East Asian traders   3.4 3.0 2.4 3.4 5.8 9.7 9.6 9.7
 
Source:  WTO Trade Statistics 2006 
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Figure 1: Growth of GDP and Exports from onset of rapid growth: China, 
India, Japan and Korea 
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Figure 2. Share of global population (%) 
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Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004. 
 
Figure 3. Trade as a proportion of GDP (%), 1970-2002
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Figure  4: China’s international organization 
memberships in comparative perspective 
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Figure 5: China‘s accession to international treaties, 1949-2003 (cumulative 
sum)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chan, 2006, China‘s compliance in global affairs, p. 75 
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Channels Impact Nature of links 
 
Complementary 
Imports of cheap consumer goods from 
Asian Drivers; Exports of commodities to 
 
 
Trade 
Competitive Imports from Asian Drivers displace local 
producers 
Complementary Inflows of FDI from Asian Drivers FDI 
Competitive Competition for US FDI from Asian Drivers 
Complementary Loans from Asian Drivers to governments Finance 
Competitive Low-cost finance from Asian Drivers 
displaces local financial intermediaries 
Complementary Support for Development Round from Global 
Governance Competitive Asian Drivers side with EU in WTO 
Complementary Asian Driver migrants intermediate Migration 
Competitive Asian Driver migrants displace local 
entrepreneurs 
Complementary Asian Drivers cooperate in regional  water Environment 
Competitive Asian Drivers as significant motors of 
global climate change 
 
Figure 6: Examples of complementary and competitive impacts 
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Channels Impact Direct Indirect 
 
Complementary
Asian Driver fabrics 
used in Lesotho’s 
  
 
Trade 
 
Competitive 
 Asian Driver competition 
in US squeezes out 
Lesotho clothing exports 
Complementary Asian Driver 
investment in 
  
 
FDI  
Competitive 
 US foreign investors 
relocate clothing 
factories from Lesotho to 
China 
Complementary Asian Driver aid for   
 
 
Finance 
 
 
Competitive 
 Asian Driver led 
realignment of 
currencies forces up the 
value of the Rand, and 
undermines profitability 
of Lesotho’s clothing 
exports 
 
Complementary
Budgetary support to 
government augments 
  
Global 
Governance 
 
Competitive 
 Asian driver input into 
WTO removes AGOA 
preferences 
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Complementary
Chinese migrants 
facilitate imports of 
  
 
Migration Competitive  Chinese migrants 
squeeze out local 
traders 
 
Complementary
Indian solar 
technologies enhance 
  
 
Environment  
Competitive 
 Asian Driver carbon 
emissions lead to global 
warming and reduce 
rainfall in Sub-Sahara 
Africa 
Figure 7: Examples of direct complementary and indirect competitive impacts 
on Lesotho 
 
 
                                                          
i  Of course we could also compare direct competitive with indirect 
complementary impacts, but for the moment this is only a notional exercise to 
illuminate the taxonomy which we are using. 
